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My article is going to be traditionally philosophical. I do not have suit-
able empirical data in hand, I do not use the latest scientific discoveries 
here, I even find it difficult to have a current overview of the theories in 
science, simply because there are too many of them, and they are too 
sophisticated. I do not treat it as an advantage, but I do not think it is 
a disadvantage, either – especially taking into account the context I want 
to explore here. I am going to sketch the theoretical background which 
has to be embedded in philosophy if we want to put the questions about 
the possibility of the integration between philosophical perspectives and 
scientific views in a comprehensible form. I am going to consider the role 
of philosophy in reformulating the basic and important philosophical 
notions. I argue that we should take some Wittgensteinian methodologi-
cal advice seriously. We should and could make philosophy the intellec-
tual area in which we can re-flect upon, re-define and re-formulate the 
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assumptions we usually tacitly take for granted in our theories, and in 
our final vocabularies. 
Let me first say something about my own philosophical story. As an 
undergraduate, I was educated simultaneously in traditional Anglo-Sax-
on analytic theories, continental German philosophy of Kant and Hegel, 
French metaphysical tradition of XXth century (including Merleau-Ponty 
and Lévinas). I was reading Husserl’s books and some texts taken from 
more broad phenomenological perspective. I was trying to understand 
the increasingly complicated conceptions in the philosophy of mind and 
the philosophy of language. I have written my MA and PhD theses in an 
analytic style, but adding many theoretical insights of late Wittgenstein 
there, which are still attractive for me. Nevertheless, I was still a bit un-
certain regarding what exactly my own position was. In addition, I was 
permanently fighting to crystallize my own basic views about the right 
and valid methodology and the role of philosophy in general. 
Being in love with philosophy, I was more and more worried that the 
role of philosophy in shaping our contemporary culture is less and less 
vivid: both in creating and refreshing ideas and ways of thinking and 
in commenting and reflecting upon current views which build contem-
porary knowledge – but also in helping to understand ourselves in our 
everyday folk culture. While admiring science and its results, I was still 
uneasy about the role of science and technology nowadays. And I could 
not shake off the feeling that this situation is the responsibility of phi-
losophy and philosophers themselves. Reading more and more, espe-
cially in the analytic tradition, I could not help having the impression 
that there is nothing which could be somehow connected with my own 
personal experience in the most sophisticated theories I was exploring. 
Something was clearly wrong; and it was not the fault of complex termi-
nology, extremely long sentences, or huge number of references to other 
texts. It was the lack of concrete lessons or bits of advice, or relevance 
to my own knowledge about myself, even understood in the most wide 
cognitive way. Frustrated, I have finally reached for books from the em-
bodied and enactive approaches. Philosophically speaking, it was an ab-
solutely refreshing experience. I have found some hope for philosophy 
again. I have realized that it can be useful in a cognitive sense, like I al-
ways believed it was. Wittgenstein’s methodology was much of use here 
for me, and that is why I call the need for theoretical re-formulations in 
philosophy “post-Wittgensteinian”.
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With Wittgenstein’s help
We all probably know the later Wittgenstein quite well1, so just to remind 
you some of his methodological ideas, I put them in a deliberate, specific 
order. I try to point out how his call for changing our attitudes in the 
way we do philosophy harmonizes with the basic ideas of an enactive 
or embodied approach in philosophy of mind. I find both directions to 
be promising in building a bridge between philosophical and scientific 
views on the matters we want to consider.
1.  Naturalism with a human face, i.e. with a human body. 
Philosophical attitude towards science
In the “Big Typescript” Wittgenstein writes “Tell yourself over and over 
(when doing philosophy): that it is a seduction that causes you to see 
thinking as a mysterious process”2. This and similar declarations, easy 
to find in his writings, I interpret as a  persuasion to treat thought, lan-
guage, subject, self and many other philosophical matters as elements of 
the natural history of humans. Language as an element of human history 
includes everything which we would call “material”. It is not a magic, 
ex-corporal, ex-physical medium of thoughts or vehicle of communica-
tion. So in order to examine the status and functions of language (which 
was always Wittgenstein’s main problem), we have to take into account 
the role of human body and its specific features.  How should we un-
derstand such an approach? Linguistic actions are for Wittgenstein of 
the same kind as the actions we usually connect with the body, like for 
example walking, drinking and eating. If we want to explain them, we 
have to take into account the embodiment and the material conditions of 
the speakers. They all belong to the same history, which seems to be for-
gotten in almost all philosophical theories of the West3. At the same time 
we should not forget that what is corporal and physical is constituted by 
means of language and vice versa
From what I have just mentioned one can quite easily conclude that 
the Wittgensteinian approach is a naturalistic one. However, it can be 
misleading to call it naturalistic without stating further reservations, es-
pecially considering the sheer number of different naturalistic theories 
we can find in contemporary philosophy of language. Let us assume that 
 1 I interpret Wittgenstein’s ideas from his main book Philosophical Investigations, 
Blackwell, Oxford 1998.
 2 L. Wittgenstein, The Big Typescript, Blackwell, Oxford 2005, p. 178e.
 3 J. Medina, Wittgenstein’s Social Naturalism. The Idea of Second Nature after the 
Philosophical Investigations”, in: The Third Wittgenstein. The Post-Investigations Works, 
ed. D. Moyal-Sharrock, Aldershot, Ashgate, p. 87.
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the most basic thesis of naturalism is that natural is everything which 
belongs to the world of nature. This general statement will be explana-
tory only when we specify what ‘nature’ and ‘natural’ mean4. There are 
two consequences for philosophical investigations which we can derive 
from that thesis. First: the Quinean postulate to study everything which 
we decide is worth studying using scientific, empirical methods. Sec-
ond: the demand of treating all entities of the human world as natural 
‘effects’ of human history and human development. Taking these conse-
quences for granted, Wittgenstein claims that there are no supernatural 
entities which philosophy has a privilege to study5, and additionally, 
there is no one proper methodology in philosophy. Philosophy is not the 
so called first science, and there are no such entities as Plato’s ideas, Des-
cartes’ res cogitans or Kant’s noumena. Philosophy is also not a base for 
natural science, as it has been treated in some philosophical views. Witt-
genstein claims that there is a fundamental difference between philoso-
phy and science, hence asking questions, raising problems, and fixing 
goals are different in both those domains. Consequently, according to 
him we will not resolve philosophical problems with scientific theories, 
as it is sometimes hoped today (by pointing to the results in psychology 
and neurology, for example)6.
Wittgenstein’s theory can be treated as a naturalistic account only 
in a certain anti-scientific sense. Wittgenstein opposes scientism in phi-
losophy and he rejects the traditional metaphysics with its requirement 
of looking for deeply hidden essences. It is important to add that the 
Wittgensteinian rejection of scientific methods in philosophy should not 
be interpreted as a call to close the door for philosophical theorizing in 
general. As I have already stressed, he does not propose one single meth-
od in describing language facts, but several, interconnected methods 
which will make such description possible from different points of view. 
To make it clear, the Wittgensteinian rejection of making philosophy sci-
entific is not an attack on science per se, but it is rather the consequence 
of his views about the role of philosophy7.
 4 R. Feldman, Methodological Naturalism in Epistemology, in: The Blackwell Guide to 
Epistemology, eds. J. Greco, E. Sosa, Blackwell, Cambridge 1999, p. 170–186; W. van Or-
man Quine, Two Dogmas of Empiricism, “Philosophical Review” 1951, no 60, p. 20–43; 
C. Cechetto, L. Rizzi, A Naturalistic Approach to Language, in: Naturalism in the Cognitive 
Sciences and the Philosophy of Mind, eds. S. Nanini, H.-J. Sandkühler, P. Lang, Berlin 
2000, p. 117–130.
 5 L. Wittgenstein, The Blue and Brown Book. Preliminary Studies for the „Philosophi-
cal Investigations”, Basil Blackwell, Oxford 1969, p. 29.
 6 M. Williams, Wittgenstein, Mind and Meaning. Towards a Social Conception of 
Mind, Routledge, London 1999, p. 240–259.
 7 G. D. Conway, Wittgenstein on Foundations, Humanities Press International, 
Atlantic Highlands N. J. 1989, p. 33; Ludwig Wittgenstein. Critical Assessments, ed. 
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We can see that Wittgenstein emphasizes the difference between 
scientific and philosophical approaches. Does it still leave any hope, if 
not for an integration, then at least  for a dialogue between science and 
philosophy? My answer is yes, if we are ready not to take all of Wittgen-
stein’s ideas at their face value, but rather read them selectively in order 
to get the best for future philosophical considerations. It is important to 
realize that the Quinean postulate of naturalizing epistemology has sev-
eral consequences for doing philosophy. Quine claims, for example, that 
while doing ontology, we should inspect the idea of widespread accep-
tance of the domain of physical objects in all areas of studies. We should 
do that in order to examine the implicit underlying assumptions which 
are taken for granted with the abovementioned idea. Philosophers are 
interested in the ontological status of language, in the way we treat such 
expressions like x exists and in all the consequences that follow. Scien-
tists do not openly deal with such problems, but they tacitly employ on-
tological and metaphysical assumptions in their theories. Philosophers’ 
task is to analyze these assumptions and make them explicit. We can 
develop a naturalistic account without excluding the importance of phil-
osophical questions and philosophical answers to them. So, in order to 
be a naturalist, we do not have to exchange all philosophical matters for 
scientific ones8; rather, we have to be more careful about the explanatory 
power of some notions (which has been pointed out by Wittgenstein in 
his rejection of scientism). 
Let me digress from the main subject for a while and ask about the 
status of empirical results in embodied approaches. Sometimes one can 
have an impression that they count exclusively on so called empirical 
answers. They are supposed to be found in commonsense experience 
and in science, such as biology and neuroscience. We should be aware 
that if “the empirical” is a metaphor, there are certain assumptions hid-
den in that notion and its interpretation. We shall ask what kind of “the 
empirical” do we refer to? Is the empirical understood in the same way 
in biology, in psychology, in neuroscience? What counts as empirical in 
our everyday experience? I suppose these are quite different things, and 
only when we reflect upon them we can see this. In particular, should 
we be more careful about the way the data from neuroscience are treated 
in the approach we are talking about? Can we uncritically treat them as 
pointing certainly at precisely such conclusions (and not others) – espe-
cially realizing all of the limitations on neuroscientific research? What 
happens when we realize that all experiments in neuroscience are highly 
S. Shanker, vol. IV: From Theology to Sociology: Wittgenstein’s Impact on Contemporary 
Thought, Routledge, London 1997, p. 9.
 8 W. van Orman Quine, Epistemology Naturalized, in: Ontological Relativity and 
Other Essays, Columbia University Press, New York 1969, p. 69–90.
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restricted by legal, ethical, technological and financial considerations? 
In one of the recent books devoted to methodological problems in neu-
roscience one can read: “The difficulty is that in order to form a simple 
generalization about how, say, the brain can reshape itself following in-
sult or injury, scientists must retreat to such a broad level of abstraction 
that their assertions become almost meaningless empirically”9. Given 
the above, what can count as the empirical in neuroscience? The answers 
to these and similar questions can build a specific area where philosophy 
can bring some help to scientific doubts.
2. Metaphilosophy and metaphysics as interconnected
The therapeutic character of Wittgensteinian philosophy can be under-
stood as a postulate to do critical metatheoretical considerations in phi-
losophy (metaphilosophy). It would mean that as philosophers, we are 
trying to show what kind of reasoning shapes the theories which already 
exist, what kind of questions – and why – we raise in those theories, 
what kind of methods we are ready to employ. Such an attitude would 
result for Wittgenstein in gaining theoretical peace, a state in which we 
stop raising questions, not because they are solved, but because we have 
realized they are not  real ones. From such a perspective, however, one 
has to be careful about its own assumptions, about the status of the ob-
ject of studies and the methods which one uses. As a result of such an 
attitude, we can raise the most important matters, such as the problem of 
what philosophy is, what kind of problems should be called philosophi-
cal ones, and what kind of philosophical notions are the proper ones10. 
I find correlations between meta-theoretical perspective in philoso-
phy and its meta-physical roots. Let me take the affix “meta-“ in both 
those notions to mean “situated behind”. Metaphysics is then under-
stood as an approach in which one tries to be aware of the assumptions 
and presuppositions of his own approach. Of course metaphysics cannot 
be traditionally treated here. So we do not look for the so called essence 
and we do not reach one correct description or one possible theory. It 
was Wittgenstein who persuaded us to introduce a certain kind of order 
in our way of treating language, but he did not believe that it can be 
given once and for all. As a result, we will have many theories and many 
answers to the question of what language, cognition, mind, body etc. 
are; answers which are initially determined by the assumptions we have 
 9  V. Gray Hardcastle, C. Matthew Stewart, Theory Structure in the Neurosciences, 
in: Theory and Method in the Neurosciences, ed. P. K. Machamer, R. Grush, P. McLaugh-
lin, University of Pittsburgh Press, Pittsburgh 2001, p. 30.
 10 See for example Tim Thornton, Wittgenstein on Language and Thought. The Phi-
losophy of Content, Edinburgh University Press, Edinburgh 1998.
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already taken. Studying the assumptions of our theories is the most im-
portant part of the metaphysical approach as I, following Wittgenstein, 
understand it. 
I think that such an antifundamentalist pluralism comes from a Witt-
gensetinian analysis of the notion of meaning. Let me explain. When 
he states the dictum according to which „meaning is use”, he does not 
make a simple theoretical maneuver of replacing the category of mean-
ing with the category of use, but he changes his investigative perspective 
in a fundamental way. The notion of meaning does not equal the notion 
of use. He is not looking for an answer to the question what is meaning 
(the idea, the concept, the mental state?), but to the question how is it possible 
that expressions of language are meaningful for humans. It involves certain 
ontological commitments to accept claims according to which there is 
no such entity as meaning, and there is no such thing as language in 
itself. We should rather speak about multiplicity of language games and 
about a variety of functions of the language games which make language 
elements meaningful. Treating the category of use as crucial lets him 
describe the complexity of language functions because he is not trying to 
single out its essential, substantial function (the most fundamental and 
pivotal property which makes language language). Let us replace the 
term language with the term ‘cognition, subject, mind’, etc. The result 
will be similar. The embodied approach is pluralistic due to its own as-
sumptions. If in order to study human cognition we have to do that in 
an embodied perspective, we must acknowledge also that a body is his-
torically (being in a certain time) and culturally (dealing with a certain 
environment) situated, hence inconstant. We have to be prepared for dif-
ferent domains of human knowledge approaching it from various points 
of view. Also, we have to leave the possibility of changing the answers 
while developing new ideas11.
It seems to me that the metaphilosophical perspective has for a while 
been the distinctive feature of analytic philosophy12, but somehow it has 
been forgotten. We develop such branches of philosophy as philosophy 
of psychology, philosophy of mind, philosophy of language, sometimes 
copying the methods of science in the process. And like in science, there 
is no place for critical thoughts about the status of the theories them-
selves. Philosophers have started answering the questions about the 
world itself (about natural language, mental processes, cognitive pro-
cesses etc.) but they have stopped investigating the assumptions which 
 11 See for example M. Luntley, Wittgenstein. Meaning and Judgment, Blackwell, 
Oxford 2003.
 12 P. M. P. Hacker, Analytic Philosophy: What, Whence and Whiter?, in: The Story of 
Analytic Philosophy. Plots and Heroes, eds. A. Biletzki, A. Matar, Routledge, London, 
New York 1998, p. 3–34.
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have to be taken in order to raise those questions. I claim that we can 
be meta-philosophically careful and develop theories in philosophy at 
the same time. We do not have to take for granted the Wittgensteinian 
requirement of not building philosophical theories. It is enough to agree 
with him about their special status. I think that philosophical solutions 
cannot be treated as absolute, timeless, totally autonomous. In opposi-
tion to Wittgenstein, we can do philosophy in which descriptions help 
to answer the questions we have raised, descriptions which are not only 
tools for challenging these questions. 
Again, let me finish this part of my article with some reflections on 
the embodied perspective. We all know that in philosophical theories 
one can find metaphysical positions. When Mark Johnson writes: “Our 
reason is an ongoing developing activity by which we understand things 
and this activity emerges for organism of the sort we are”13 he assumes 
a lot about what an activity is. There is nothing wrong in that as a matter 
of course, as long we remember that we elaborate the notions in a way 
we do, here in an embodied way. So in a sense the idea of embodiment 
is both our point of arrival and our point of departure, which is a meta-
physical idea. The philosophers from the embodied tradition seem to be 
aware of it. Johnson and Lakoff write: “we also need to avoid all assump-
tions that circumscribe what is to count as data in such a way as to pre-
determine the outcome”14. We are not able to avoid all such assumptions 
of course. If there is something in our bodily equipment which can de-
termine once and for all the way we perceive and cognize the world, and 
if we can describe what it is, we will be able to show, that there are some 
crucial systems of categories without which we cannot cognize anything 
at all. If our basic perception is always conceptualized (and our concepts 
are always filtered by bodily perception), there is no way in which we 
can take the point of view from nowhere. It builds a philosophical stance 
which is not only foundationless,  but also requires a view where the ob-
jective/subjective division is not valid. In that sense meta-philosophical 
analysis shapes metaphysical approach as well.
What about the integration?
It is high time to try to answer the question which has been raised in 
the title of my article. Let me do it indirectly. Firstly, it is worth looking 
at it in a meta-philosophical way. Why the difference between science 
 13 M. Johnson, Embodied Reason, in: Perspectives on Embodiment. The Intersection of 
Nature and Culture, eds. G. Weiss, H. F. Haber, Routledge, New York 1999, p. 82.
 14 G. Lakoff, M. Johnson, Philosophy in the Flesh: The Embodied Mind and Its Chal-
lenge to Western Thought, Basic Books, New York 1999, p. 79.
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and philosophy is so obviously recognizable nowadays? What has hap-
pened during the long history of human knowledge that we have started 
to think about philosophy and science as two different fields with dif-
ferent methodologies and different goals. We all know that such ques-
tions would be bizarre for the contemporaries of e.g. Isaac Newton. So, 
the very status of science and philosophy is a historical fact and as such 
can change again. Maybe the initial step in investigating these matters 
is careful consideration of the content of the question itself. What do 
we mean by “science” and by “philosophy”? Do we mean certain theo-
ries and methodologies, or rather the most important goals, or maybe 
the representatives of the communities of scientists and philosophers? 
Do we have in mind today’s science and philosophy, or some historical 
aspects of them as well? Getting more detailed helps us to see that the 
answer to the question I have asked here depends on the way in which 
we understand the terms we use (which is a Wittgensteinian hint again). 
Let me treat philosophy and science in a bit sociological way, as very 
sophisticated institutions with their own special regulations, explicit and 
implicit goals, interrelations between people, and connections with fi-
nancial and political matters. Is their integration possible then? I claim 
that it is possible on the methodological level, where philosophers and 
scientists can achieve the same goals (to do research work on human 
cognition for example), and where philosophers can build notional foun-
dations for experiments which are done by scientists. Such an attitude 
requires defining common interests which can be shared by both fields, 
hence requires many changes in understanding the role and the status of 
philosophy and science. In other words, it requires both the philosopher 
and the scientist to see their own positions differently. However, I do 
not believe that the integration on the level of domains is possible. Sci-
ence and philosophy have common and different elements in their his-
torical background, but the trend to underline the differences between 
them is still very strong now. In my opinion, the institutionalization of 
knowledge, among others things, is responsible for re-producing the dif-
ference we are talking about. The idea of usefulness which is central in 
contemporary culture has to be mentioned here as well. Possible scien-
tific results seem to be more ‘useful’ for technology for example than the 
results of philosophical debates. Being used in that way, science is more 
manifestly present, hence it is easier to make the needed space for scien-
tific activities in all possible areas (including their financial and political 
dimensions). Philosophy has worse public relations so to speak, and on 
the scale of what is and what is not useful, is situated quite low. 
We all know that apart from many deeply historically grounded ste-
reotypes about the differences between science and philosophy, philo-
sophical ideas influence science and vice versa. In my view, philosophy 
is a kind of – so to speak – notional work, or re-working of the terms 
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structured in a language we use (understood in a wide Wittgenstein’s 
sense) in various traditions (including the common sense tradition). We 
all know that the very crucial part of science is to build the system of 
terms and the method of doing research in order to get the best results. 
If so, even initially there are a lot of things in common in these two ar-
eas of the development of human thought. And what is more, a lot of 
ideas from both fields influence what we call common sense15. If science 
is foundationless and contingent as Francisco Varela, among others, has 
pointed out, and it does not need foundations in order to be a reliable 
source of knowledge for humans, we can make it more friendly for daily, 
embodied human experience, which, being subjective in a sense, is not 
treated as epistemologically useless anymore16. However, in order to 
agree with that we have to change our philosophical standpoint in the 
direction of the pluralist, meta-philosophical, historically and materially 
situated position of the Wittgensteinian kind that I was sketching here. 
There is a long tradition in philosophy of science coming from 
hermeneutics stating that science is a kingdom of Erklärung and philoso-
phy (or more generally the humanities) is the kingdom of verstehen. In 
order to make room for methodological integration between science and 
philosophy, as I have mentioned earlier, we have to give up this division. 
I do not believe that there is a fundamental difference between explana-
tion and understanding, because to me, they are both kinds of interpreta-
tion. I could not agree more with professor Gallagher when he writes: 
“Explanation is no less interpretation than understanding. The interpre-
tation of quantitative data, for example, relies on certain developments 
in the history of science and on qualitative judgements among scientists, 
including judgements that the way they interpret their data is important 
and valuable for the community of scientists and the funding agencies 
that constitute part of their audience”17.
As we have seen, the integration between scientific and philosophi-
cal views is possible only when our attitude towards the role and sta-
tus of both science and philosophy has changed: both in common sense 
knowledge, in so called pop-cultural opinions and in philosophy of sci-
ence (there is still a lot of work to be done there). As it has been men-
tioned before, both science in its diversity and philosophy with its many 
different theories, are areas of human intellectual activity. They are both 
historically, culturally and materially (bodily) situated, and although we 
can point out their specific features, there is nothing fundamentally and 
 15 F. Varela, E. Thompson, E. Rosch, The Embodied Mind. Cognitive Science and Hu-
man Experience, MIT Press, Cambridge, Massachusetts 1991, p. 44.
 16 Ibidem, p. 244.
 17 S. Gallagher, Hermeneutics and the Cognitive Sciences, “Journal of Consciousness 
Studies” 2004, no 10–11, p. 3.
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essentially impassable which would block the integration between these 
fields. This is especially so if we want to get useful knowledge, compat-
ible with personal experience about ourselves, our minds, bodies, and 
cognitive apparatuses. And there is still a lot to be done to make the in-
tegration in question visible. Let me finish with an example. As a mother 
of a seventeen-month-old daughter, I have a lot books about children’s 
health and children’s development. They are based on scientific research 
and the authors are basically scientists or medical doctors themselves. 
My daughter has had cold recently. I have read a very detailed descrip-
tion of this illness, of parents’ feelings and a child’s condition in those 
books, and it has turned out to have nothing to do with the experience 
the we as parents went through with our baby being ill. It is disappoint-
ing that it is impossible to make a description of the illness compatible 
with personal experience having all informative scientific results in hand. 
Maybe the easiest thing in order to change this is to add the perspective 
of a philosopher here who is a mother or a father at the same time.
Streszczenie
Czy można zintegrować perspektywę filozoficzną  
z poglądami naukowymi?  
Po-Wittgensteinowska próba przeformułowań teoretycznych
Zauważając, że istnieje wyraźne napięcie między różnorodnymi doświadczenia-
mi osobistymi a sposobem, w jaki traktuje je nauka, możemy również przyjąć, że 
życzylibyśmy sobie wypracowania perspektywy, która łączyłaby to, co indywi-
dualne, z metodami naukowymi i wynikami badań. Jeśli ponadto zgodzimy się 
z twierdzeniem, że konieczne są zmiany w sposobie opisywania i analizowania 
ludzkiego podmiotu, jako filozofowie musimy stawić czoła następującemu py-
taniu: Jaka jest rola filozofii w poszukiwaniu wspólnej metodologii, dzięki której 
będzie możliwe połączenie osobistych doświadczeń ludzi z opisami naukowymi 
tych doświadczeń? 
W artykule zarysowuję teoretyczne tło, na którym należałoby osadzić filo-
zofię, jeśli chcemy powyższą metodologię dookreślić w zrozumiałej formie. 
Przekonuję, że korzystając z pewnych wskazówek Ludwiga Wittgensteina 
i podążając śladami wybranych współczesnych ucieleśnionych teorii podmiotu 
poznającego formułowanych w naukach kognitywnych, można stworzyć prze-
strzeń intelektualną, w której da się przemyśleć i ponownie sformułować zało-
żenia, które zwykle milcząco przyjmujemy za pewnik, myśląc o kształcie nauki 
i zadaniach filozofii.
Słowa kluczowe: Wittgenstein, naturalizm, ucieleśnienie, metafilozofia
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Summary
Is the integration of the philosophical  perspective and the 
scientific views possible?  
The post-Wittgensteinian need for theoretical re-formulations
If we agree that there is a visible tension between various personal experiences 
and the way in which science treats them, we can also assume that we would like 
to find a perspective which would link what is first-personally individual with 
scientific methods and the results of research. If we additionally consent to the 
claim that vital changes are needed to the mode in which we describe and ana-
lyse the human subject, as philosophers we have to face the following question: 
What is the role of philosophy in looking for a common methodology capable of 
uniting both human personal experience and scientific descriptions? I am going 
to sketch the theoretical background which has to be embedded in philosophy if 
we want to put it in a comprehensible form. I argue that following some Wittgen-
steinian hints and traces from the contemporary embodied theories of knowing 
subjects in the cognitive science we could construct the intellectual area in which 
we can reflect upon and re-formulate the assumptions we usually tacitly take 
for granted while thinking about the shape of science and tasks of philosophy. 
Keywords: Wittgenstein, naturalism, embodiment, metaphilosophy
